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Evidence:
Admissibility vs. Weight in Scientific Testimony
David L. Faigman1
Fundamental to all evidence codes is the distinction between
admissibility and weight. Judges decide admissibility, and, if the
evidence is admitted, jurors decide what weight to give it. Hence, a
“dying declaration” that is hearsay is only admissible if the judge
determines, among other things, that the statement was made by a
declarant “while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent.”2
This predicate issue of whether the defendant believed death was
imminent is called a “preliminary fact,” one that the judge must
determine by a preponderance of the evidence. If admitted, the
weight, if any, that should be accorded the particular dying
declaration is up to the jury to decide.
This division of responsibilities between judge and jury also
applies to scientific evidence presented by experts. Although
fundamental to all evidentiary decisions, this distinction received
little attention in courts’ consideration of experts until the Supreme
Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3
Daubert, interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702, held that judges
are “gatekeepers” and obligated to determine whether the methods
and principles underlying proffered expert testimony are—more
likely than not—reliable and valid.4 The Court thus treated the
evidentiary reliability of the scientific evidence proffered in the case
as a preliminary fact and thus within the judge’s purview to
determine.
In contrast to the usual preliminary-fact determination, however,
the complex nature of scientific evidence has created substantial
confusion among courts about just where the judge’s authority to
decide admissibility ends and the jury’s responsibility to assess
weight begins. Daubert endeavored to set this line by instructing
1. Summarized and excerpted from David L. Faigman, Christopher
Slobogin & John Monahan, Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of
Scientific Research to Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in
Expert Testimony, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (2016).
2. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. Id. at 589.
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judges to “focus . . . solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate.”5 This distinction between
methodology and principles on the one hand and conclusions on the
other has assumed major significance. Many courts believe that the
methodology-conclusions distinction provides a useful guide for
distinguishing the judge’s role from that of the jury. However, the
Court itself abandoned this distinction just four years after Daubert
in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,6 and the 2000 amendments to Rule
702 made no mention of it.
Using Science to Guide Scientific Testimony
In fact, the methodology-conclusions distinction has no
principled basis in science and thus should have none in law. Since
the distinction does not align with the nature of the evidence that
scientists proffer in court, it is destined to fail and should be
explicitly jettisoned. In its place, courts should adopt a framework
that is consonant with the structure of science itself.
The structure of scientific evidence has one central characteristic:
science is general in nature because it involves study of categories of
individuals or cases rather than study of a single individual or case.
Generalization permeates the scientific enterprise, cutting across
methodology, principles, and conclusions. In a nutshell, then, the
legally relevant issue of whether, say, benzene can cause leukemia is
a general question that involves the methods, principles, and
conclusions embedded in the research. If the answer to this question
is affirmative, there remains the methodology, principles, and
conclusions on the ultimate issue of whether a specific plaintiff’s
leukemia was caused by benzene exposure.
This insight regarding the fundamental generality of science has
an important consequence for the distinction between admissibility
and weight. In short, scientific procedures and principles, as well as
any conclusions of general application that are derived from them,
ought to be evaluated by judges, not by juries that sit on a single
case.

5. Id. at 595.
6. 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology are
not entirely distinct from one another.”).
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It is a well-established aspect of our modern jury system that,
while laypeople are in charge of finding facts specific to the case at
hand, courts are in charge of ascertaining legal rules that will have
application to other cases. This allocation is based in part on an
assessment of the relative capacities of judges and juries and in part
on a desire for uniformity across cases. The same rule should apply
for facts that will have application to other cases, for the same
reasons.
Acceptance of this proposition means that the role of the judge
and jury should depend not on a distinction between methodology
and conclusion but on the distinction between the general and the
specific. The reliability that Daubert, Joiner, and Rule 702 all require
the judge to determine as a preliminary fact entails assessing every
aspect of scientific evidence, not just its methodology or some other
subset of the testimony.
At the same time, the general-specific distinction that derives
from the nature of scientific inference also means that, whether they
involve methods or conclusions, factual disputes that relate solely to
the case at hand are for the jury to assess. Thus, whether an expert in
the instant case actually applied the methodology that the judge
found valid generally is a matter of weight, as is any conclusion the
expert reaches that is applicable to the litigants.7
For example, in the controversial area of “shaken baby
syndrome,”8 an expert’s assertion that research indicates that
subdural hematoma, retinal bleeding, and brain swelling, when they
appear together, are indicative of child abuse is a general proposition
and a matter of admissibility; an expert’s assertion that the victim in
the case had this triad of symptoms, however, is a case-specific
assertion and thus a matter of weight.

7. The only caveat here is the traditional one that the judge may keep
any issues from the jury when no rational jury could credit the expert’s
assertions about them. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
8. Compare Sandeep K. Naveng et al., A Daubert Analysis of
Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome – Part II: An Examination of
the Differential Diagnosis, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 203, 207 (2013)
(finding the science fundamentally sound) with Keith A. Findley et al.,
Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma and Actual Innocence:
Getting it Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 213 (2012) (finding
the science fundamentally unsound).
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Likewise, in a case involving testimony about DNA, the
assertion that a particular method of testing DNA is reliable is of
general import and a matter of admissibility, while an opinion
regarding a case-specific fact, such as whether the technician
properly labeled the samples prior to testing, is a matter of weight. A
labor economist in an employment-discrimination case who
admittedly fails to control for a key variable such as seniority or
wage structure in a regression analysis has committed a general error
that should lead to exclusion by a judge; but determining whether the
economist did in fact include such a variable, or whether he or she
obtained accurate information about the variable, is an assessment
that should be carried out by the jury.
Specifying the Boundaries of the Admissibility-Weight Distinction
Although the proposal described here is entirely consistent with
the current version of the Federal Rules, the following test sets forth
clearly the boundary between a judge’s obligation to determine
admissibility and the jury’s task to assess weight:
Preliminary facts that describe the principles or methods of
scientific research or generally applicable conclusions drawn
therefrom are within the judge’s responsibility to decide as a
matter of admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a) and equivalent state rules. Conditional facts that
describe whether the expert adhered to a reliable principle or
method are matters of weight and within the province of the
trier of fact to decide if a reasonable trier of fact could find
that the fact is true, as provided in Federal Rule of Evidence
104(b).
This approach to the admissibility-weight issue in expert
testimony cases has three important benefits. First, it aligns squarely
with the purposes of evidence codes and the Constitution’s dueprocess and right-to-jury provisions by making optimal use of the
relative competencies of judges and juries. Juries will be prevented
from hearing unreliable evidence and, at the same time (assuming the
expert testimony is admitted), will be given full authority to decide
facts relevant to the case before them.
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Second, the division suggested by the structure of scientific
inference implements the key goal of ensuring uniformity between
cases regarding general propositions of science.
Third, and possibly more important for a rule of evidence, this
approach has the benefit of clarity. The current focus on attempting
to distinguish methodology from conclusions leaves courts in a
quandary because, as a scientific matter, methodology and
conclusions are not always separable. The proposed alternative is
more straightforward: when the statement of fact (or inference) that
is asserted to support proffered expert opinion transcends the instant
case, it is a preliminary fact to be decided by the court under Rule
104(a). When the statement of fact (or inference) that is asserted to
support proffered opinion is pertinent only in the instant case (after a
judge has found that it is the product of reliable principles and
methods), it is a question of weight and only subject to review under
Rule 104(b) as a matter of conditional relevance.

